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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The Tribune

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Introduction

By JOHN BIRD
Editor, The Winnipeg Tribune

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THE Peace of Munich marked, if it did not create, a new situation. Whether one welcomes or deprecates this world situation the sensible thing to do is to examine it realistically in its bearings on Canadian and Commonwealth foreign policy.

That is it a new situation is not difficult to establish. With the partition of Czechoslovakia has gone the ring of French alliances around Germany upon which so much of post-war diplomacy centred. For the time being Germany and Italy are arbiters of Middle, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. There has been a definite shift in the balance of power.

Germany's March to the East, at least economically and politically, is in full progress again. Russia has been isolated on the East and France on the West and Hitler's preference for four-power negotiations in Europe, excluding Russia, has been gratified.

That the new situation is serious, if it is not downright bad, is demonstrated by the redoubled demand for rearmament in Great Britain, coming in the first place from the National Government itself, but supported and enlarged upon by many of the government's chief critics. The feeling is general in Great Britain that there can be no resolute British foreign policy without a much more adequate national defense. However, it is also recognized that rearmament does not in itself constitute foreign policy but only makes a foreign policy possible and there is much more general agreement on the need for rearmament than upon the course which foreign policy should take after national defense has been secured.

Arguments over the events which led up to Munich may be interesting, even fascinating. But, valuable as it may be in indicating the trend of events there seems to be too great a tendency to thrash over old straw or to cry over spilt milk. The need of the hour seems rather, to be for a realistic examination of the new situation marked by Munich.

Recent by-elections in Great Britain may have cast some doubt upon British popular approval of the Chamberlain government's recent course in foreign policy. The reaction of British opinion to the Nazi pogroms against the Jews and the onslaughts of the Nazi press against British statesmen like Eden, Duff Cooper, Greenwood and Churchill, may, at least temporarily, have put a halt to the National government's policy of appeasing Germany. In particular, they may postpone British initiative in the colonial question with Germany. But, no matter what is the course of political events in Britain and throughout the Empire, this cannot for one moment undo what was done at Munich, nor will it restore Czechoslovakia and the ring of French alliances. It still leaves a new situation to be faced.

A number of British authorities lustily approve the return to "realism" registered at Munich and welcome leaving Germany a free hand in Middle and Eastern Europe. They would prefer to concentrate upon making friends with Mussolini so as to secure Imperial interests, at least upon Italian sufferance, in the Mediterranean. Others see the extension of the Rome-Berlin axis to London—to Printing House Square, at least, if not to Downing Street. Still others mark the death-blow to "collective security."

Here in Canada the recent world crisis had a profound effect. It may confidently be ventured that Canadians by and large, were ready to support Great Britain wholeheartedly, if it were necessary, to stop Hitler from taking Czechoslovakia at the point of the bayonet, though there would have been some question over the extent of Canada's participation, at least in the province of Quebec. But outside that province there was little talk of neutrality on this issue and Canadians faced up to it as their own affair. One by-pro-

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duct of the crisis is likely to be enhanced demand for Canadian national defense. But, underlying the silence of the Canadian government throughout the crisis, was the problem of maintaining Canadian unity so that, once more, this most vital of all Canadian questions has been thrust forward—this time by international and not domestic events.

A dozen questions will spring to every reader's mind. *The Tribune* proposes, therefore, to present symposium of views upon the situation confronting Canada and the Commonwealth after Munich, under the general heading *Where Do We Go From Here?* Opinions will be presented by a variety of Canadian authorities with widely different points of view. Representation will be given also to British and American reactions.

Realistic Examination Needed

By E. J. TARR, K.C.

President, Monarch Life Assurance Co.

WAS Munich a diplomatic victory of the two great European democracies, or was it a diplomatic defeat of the first magnitude? If a defeat, was it an inevitable one to be accepted with as good grace as possible, or was it one which could have been avoided without war if more enlightened policies had been followed during the previous months and years? Did Munich follow in natural sequence from Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain and China, or did it constitute another phase of a courageous rearguard action against the rising power of the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships?

Canadians do not agree in their answers to these questions, and it is not of prime importance that they should. The electors of Great Britain must face and answer them, because from their answers there will result the duty of endeavoring to maintain in power, or to remove from power, the Chamberlain government which has been responsible for policy. Canadian citizens, whether they regret it or not, have no such duty to perform because the United Kingdom government is not responsible to them.

Canadians, therefore, need not necessarily answer these questions, but good citizenship demands that they assess the resulting world situation, regardless of how it arose. Having reached an informed judgment, each of us should bring his influence to bear in the shaping of Canadian policy in conformity with international developments.

This involves the answering of another set of questions. Is Germany satiated? If she makes further demands in Europe or for colonies, is it reasonably likely that they can and will be sucessfully or permanently resisted? If resistance be contemplated, will Britain and France have as many potential friends in Europe as they had before Munich? Would Russia be as likely to actively cooperate with the democracies? Is it reasonable to hope that the swing of the Central European and Balkan states into the German orbit may be reversed in the near future?

In a recent study on armaments by the Foreign Policy Association of New York, it appears that Germany's present rate of expenditure is two and one-third times that of Great Britain, and while that of France exceeds the Italian, nevertheless the total of Germany and Italy is almost double that of Great Britain and France.

In view of this, is time working in favor of the democracies? Are there other factors which offset the apparent worsening of the position with regard to armaments? Is it reasonably possible that Britain and France may recover their lost prestige, or is it possible that the *Pax Britannica* of the nineteenth century, which was based on enlightened self-interest, has now given way to a *Pax Germanica* (if there is to be peace) based on the growing demands of an overpowering bully?

There is no doubt as to the answers which all Canadians would like to be able to give to these questions, but sound judgment rather than wishful thinking is required.

If the answers in the main are what we do not want them to be, serious issues are raised, not only for Great Britain but for Eire, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada—the issues resulting from a relatively weakening Britain and a relatively strengthening Germany. If, unhappily, this prospect from which we shrink should be realized and become clear in the early future, it will necessitate a radical readjustment of policies in each of the British countries. In each case the national policy should be the resultant of various factors—the geographical position of the country, its

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racial composition, the varying sentiments of its peoples, its economic needs, its defense requirements. While self-interest will and should be the governing factor, a sense of world citizenship responsibility will be necessary in each case to make the national policy one of enlightened self-interest.

All will agree as to the possibility of such further deterioration of the international situation, although there may be no agreement as to its probability. Surely, however, it is appropriate that in a spirit of friendship and goodwill to the British and all other freedom-loving nations, we be realistically alert to the implications of the developments of the recent past and the immediate future, so that as Canadians we may contribute to the shaping of an enlightened Canadian policy wisely adjusted to whatever may be the facts.

Germany: Friend or Outcast?

By H. N. FIELDHOUSE

Professor of History, University of Manitoba

THE crucial error of the Czech politicians, before the Peace of Munich, was to imagine they could live with Germany in Central Europe and yet lend themselves to the promotion of anti-German policies. If the directors of Czech foreign policy were suicidally short-sighted, however, they had at least this excuse—that their folly was merely one aspect of the Great Illusion which overshadowed the entire face of international affairs between 1919 and 1933. When historians come to write the history of our century, I suspect that they will dismiss those years in the shortest of paragraphs. For the central fact in the European situation from 1919 to 1933 was that during that period Germany could be temporarily ignored as a great power.

Now by that fact, alone, the European system as it existed in those fourteen years stood condemned as being entirely artificial. For there are many things which you can do with Germany, but there is one thing which you cannot do; you cannot ignore her. In any real and lasting balance of power in Europe, Germany must be a very important factor indeed, and if for no other reason than her size and her strategic position astride the centre of the continent, no arrangement which leaves her out of account can be expected to be permanent.

From 1919 to 1933, however, Germany was temporarily exhausted, and the most striking single factor in the whole of post-war history was the way in which so many otherwise responsible students of international affairs, appeared to assume that that exhaustion would be permanent. The writer of this article always belonged to that small group which never ceased to prophesy that within ten years of the signing of the Peace Treaties, Germany would be back as the strongest single military power in Europe, and history and Hitler have vindicated that opinion.

What does the change since 1933 mean? It means that we are back to reality—an unpleasant reality, possibly, since the tone of the new Germany is, as usual, unpleasant—but still, reality. No permanent structure of peace could be built upon the situation as it stood between 1919 and 1933, because in the absence of the greatest military power in Europe, its foundations were artificial. Once Germany found herself again, there was bound to be a difficult period of adjustment, a period made worse because the diplomatic habits of Germany are apt to be a trifle crude, and it is in that period of adjustment that we are now living.

What is it, then, which lies behind German dissatisfaction? Briefly, it is the fact that Germany lost the last war. This does not necessarily mean that she wants to fight another war in order to win it, but it does mean that she is hypersensitive and touchy about her position as a great power. We must remember how very recent is Germany's political unity and German political power. Before 1870, nationalist-minded Germans were passionately resentful of Germany's weak and divided political condition, and when, in 1870, Bismarck at last succeeded in creating a united and powerful Germany, her people found a new and dangerous intoxication in this unaccustomed sense of power.

From 1870 to 1914, Germany was the dominant power in Europe. The knowledge of her strength burned itself into the minds of the peoples and chancelleries of Europe, as it was natural that Germans who remembered the pitiable weakness of pre-Bismarckian Germany should take pride in this new-found dominance. Between 1919 and 1933, however, Germany ceased to rank as a great power, and though Hitler has now restored her to that position, a certain resentment still rankles in German minds. German power

is restored, German policy has again seized the initiative, what the German government thinks or does is once more of paramount importance to the rest of the world, but there is still something lacking. Germany is powerful again, but she is internationally isolated. For Hitler's work of restoring German unity at home and German power abroad has unfortunately been accompanied by measures which have forfeited the goodwill of a large part of the outside world, and the German government is uneasily conscious of living in a kind of moral isolation.

It is here that the great threat to peace lies today; for once a dominant power comes to feel that it is being steadily reprobated as a kind of moral offender, it will slip rapidly into the position of a great outlaw, an enemy of the common peace.

It is to prevent this development that the British government is straining every nerve today. That Germany must again be the single strongest military power in Europe is certain. Need that mean, however, that she must again, as before 1914, become the supreme mischief-maker? That is the vital question. Is Germany to be driven into outlawry, or can we restore contact with her and draw her once more into the European concert, into the common comity of Western Europe?

A Nationalist Canadian View

By R. O. MacFARLANE

Professor of History, University of Manitoba

MUNICH—salvation of the peace of the world; Munich—a bad word which children should not be allowed to overhear. Canadian opinion has run the whole gamut, from work of God to work of the devil. Was Munich really a turning point in the affairs of the world? Did it really affect the interests of this country vitally?

Whatever may be the answer to the last query, Munich jarred Canadian opinion as has no agreement since the end of the war. It has cut across racial, party and sectional lines, and even across traditional alignments on issues of foreign policy.

Some of our imperialists have crawled into their shell and justified the arrangement on the ground that anything that Britain does must, *ipso facto*, be right. Since it is right, Canada should follow, and do no reasoning why. We should respect our betters in these matters. Other imperialists, however, are upset. They do not like the agreement, and in criticizing the settlement, they maintain that the British government has sold the Empire down the river. But it is the British government, not Britain, that is at fault. Once again we have in our midst a group more British than the British, more loyal than the King. The ghosts of Alan McNab and the annexationists of 1849 still stalk in the land.

Supporters of collective security have been profoundly shocked. They see in Munich the end of the political functions of the League, and in consequence their vision of a world order vanishes into thin air. They place the blame for this unfortunate result square on the shoulders of the British government, hence they are coming frankly to distrust the control of Canadian foreign policy from Westminster. The nationalists look for recruits from the more disillusioned members of this group.

Even the nationalists are not any too happy about the whole business. They support the agreement for two reasons. First, it was not our agreement, and hence we had no right to tell somebody else what he should do about it. Second, they are pleased because war was averted, and it was obvious that Canadian participation was going to be automatic. Such a course might well have had disastrous national consequences, without adequate offsetting advantages. But this is a short view. What of the future for a small country which depends to so great an extent on its exports for its livelihood? Can we afford the risk of being involved in a European war every twenty years? If not, what can we do to prevent our being involved in such a conflict?

The time is ripe for Canada to assume the conduct of her own foreign relations, in fact as well as in theory. It is admitted by all parties that in the crisis of last September we would have been involved almost automatically. It is true that Parliament would have decided the issue, but by the time Parliament had assembled we would have been committed to a point from which there was no turning back. The nationalist maintains that we should extricate ourselves from circumstances of this sort, so that the issue of peace and war can be decided in terms of Canadian interests, just as would any question of domestic policy.

It is well to remember that the issue of peace or war puts the vital question of individual freedom in a peculiar position. A good nationalist could oppose participation in a European war in which our interests were not involved up to the point where our own government was committed. Once our government does declare itself, however, what was formerly merely the expression of opinion, may then easily become treason. In addition many nationalists feel that under our system of government every citizen, whether he

agrees with the government or not, is bound by the decision of that government. In the world today no state can tolerate opposition to a war in which it is engaged. Hence it is of first importance *how* our government becomes committed, whether by its own choice, or by circumstances over which it has no control.

It may be necessary, because of our historical background and our traditions, for Canada to resort to some type of neutrality legislation. From the point of view of belligerent powers this would make our position somewhat clearer. At least it would help us to maintain the right of choosing a national policy. Such legislation would be useful in preserving the *status quo* until Parliament could assemble to make its decision. The important point, however, is that we must clarify our position vis-a-vis British policy *before* a crisis arises. Once the crisis is upon us, commitment will be automatic. To refuse to face the issue in time of tranquillity is to commit ourselves in time of stress.

Effective control of our foreign policy, along with abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, is the most important step still to be taken in the acquisition of self-government in Canada. Both of these steps can be taken without affecting detrimentally our relationship to either the Crown or the Commonwealth of Nations. But action must be taken before the next crisis is upon us or it will be too late. The people of Canada are capable of self-government. In the abstract, they desire self-government. Surely they will not shrink from the realities of self-government at the eleventh hour.

Canada Becoming Canadian

By F. R. SCOTT
Professor of Civil Law, McGill University

AFTER Munich, certain things became very clear.

Before Munich it was possible to argue that the Chamberlain government, for all its undermining of the League of Nations, was ultimately working for collective security. Now that cannot be argued. There is not a single great power in Europe today which makes the re-establishment of the League a part of its foreign policy. There is some vague talk of a new League based on co-operation and not force. If this comes about it will be nothing but the old Concert of Europe, periodic meetings between the great powers, at which the map will be refashioned to suit their interests. In fact, Munich itself was the first meeting of this new League.

Before Munich it might be argued that the support of democracy in Europe was a British interest, which required military intervention. This is clearly not so. Sacrificing European democracy is a price Mr. Chamberlain will pay for peace.

Therefore if Canada helps Mr. Chamberlain to fight another war, she will not be fighting for collective security or for democracy. Even if Mr. Chamberlain defeated all European dictatorships he would not rebuild the League on its former principles, and he obviously is just as fond of fascism as he is of a democracy that is turning socialist (as in Spain). Canadians in the next European war will be fighting to keep Mr. Chamberlain in office and his government from a military defeat.

It therefore follows that all former collectivists and militant democrats, who wanted to go to war for other than racial reasons, must decide whether they still wish to fight in Europe or not under the new conditions. If they do, they belong to the imperialist school; if they do not, they must turn isolationist or Pan-American. Canadian foreign policy becomes much simpler since Munich. Now it is a straight choice between old-style imperialism and new-style Canadianism based on Canada's interest as an American nation.

Another point became clear after Munich. It is now evident that the official policy of Canada is old-style imperialism. Mr. King's verbal policy is one of "no commitments" and "let Parliament decide." But his real policy is the opposite. For he has not obtained for Canada the right of neutrality; he leaves the obligation to turn over Halifax and Esquimault to the Admiralty untouched; he has not appointed Canadian ministers to the capitals of the powers we are most likely to be fighting; he continues to spend money on certain forms of military preparation that are only useful for war abroad.

He knows quite well that war will have started in Canada before Parliament ever assembles. We should have been involved in September, 1938, exactly as we were involved in August, 1914—because some one else made a decision for us. A man who allows old commitments to continue is a man who favors those commitments.

Notice that Canada would have been the only nation in North or South America that would have been automatically involved last September. Every other American country would have had to decide for itself what it was going to do. The difference between them and us is not that the "land-hungry" dictatorships have singled out Canada as the special object of their foreign policy. The difference is that we are still a European colony and the others are not. They have a right to neutrality and we have not. Yet we are told by many eminent Canadians that all talk of this right is "academic," a vision of "impractical" people!

This is another lesson from Munich. At that time the imperialist school got a bad jolt. Canada actually refused to promise in advance to fight whoever the British government told them to. This is scandalous, even though it was perfectly clear that Mr. King was all ready to jump in once the outbreak of war had made organized opposition impossible. Something must be done about it. So something is being done about it. All across Canada there is evident a concerted drive to bolster up the declining colonialism. The League of Nations Society "Peace Week" was converted by the speakers into a sort of national scare week. Even Mr. Lapointe began frightening us about the rulers who "may not ask our permission" before they claim territories here. (Curious then that Canada does not send a delegate to Lima, where plans for defending the Americas are being discussed). The public mind is being prepared for large increases in defense forces. We are being kept in a state of jitters, so that we accept war for Canada as inevitable, and of course hardly think at all about the problems of the unemployed, or of profiteering, or of the maldistribution of wealth, or internal social questions generally. It will be noticed that the higher the income, the stronger the support for the imperialist policy.

Now all this is quite reasonable and proper in a democracy. There are two main schools of opinion in Canada about foreign policy, and the imperialist school is undoubtedly the most powerful (though not necessarily the most numerous). The new Canadian nationalism is just growing amongst British Canadians. It is hesitant, scattered, uncertain of its objectives. It is not inspired by an anti-British feeling—rather it believes that full self-government for Canada is simply an example of British freedom—but it cannot help being manoeuvred into a position by its opponents that looks anti-British.

The man that shouts "Ready, aye, ready," seems more British than the man who says, "We will decide for ourselves according to what *we* think is right for Canada," but actually he is not. We have inherited a colonial form of loyalty that makes us measure a Canadian's patriotism more by his "yes man" qualities than by his independence of mind. How "loyal" of Australia and New Zealand to write a blank cheque for Mr. Chamberlain last September. Loyal to what? Certainly not loyal to Czechoslovakia. Not to the League. And not loyal to the principles of responsible government.

After Munich, English Canada is going to become more Canadian. Then perhaps it will understand French Canada, and we shall have a real country.

A Pro-Chamberlain View

By EDWARD ANDERSON, K.C.
President, Winnipeg Electric Company

THE first thing to grasp in discussing the Peace of Munich is the complete breakdown of the League of Nations machinery, and alongside that the disappearance of diplomatic custom in negotiation. Germany has become sensitive and her methods of diplomacy are new. Herr Hitler insists on personal contact when it suits him and is inaccessible when such contact is inconvenient; so that those who blame the present administration in Great Britain for their past and present policy can hardly criticize Mr. Chamberlain for courageously accepting the necessity of going direct to Hitler when it was a matter of life and death for the British Commonwealth.

The worst that can be said about Munich is that it is an armistice. But even that is a big thing. Meantime there is a growing revulsion against the idea of war, the democracies are moving together, diplomatic activity has become marked, and recent events in Germany are bringing a reluctant United States into the orbit of world affairs and suggesting how unrealistic has become the isolationist position, and Germany is at least superficially showing signs of being willing to adopt concilliatory methods.

There is hope for appeasement in Europe. Mr. Chamberlain's plan of European co-operation certainly should be tried. It is odd to find League supporters and pacifists so militant and so determined to risk the use of the sword in determining the issues, while left-wing parties shout defiance at Fascism and Nazidom. Russia, however, appears to be withdrawing into a curious position of isolation. Not so much is heard of the Popular Front from that country. Indeed, there are intimations that the world revolution campaign is to be revived. The economic position of France is disturbing to say the least, and I question whether France was in a position before Munich to carry out her military engagements.

Now Munich is over, what has happened in the past two months which should command the majority of support of Canadians?

1. The trade treaties with United States and Great Britain are a step forward. The Ottawa agreements are thus modified to widen trade with other countries. Here may be the beginning of a new series of trade treaties that will bind the Western democracies together.

2. The North American defense policy of the United States and co-operation with the United States in this matter. The speeches of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Mackenzie King on this phase have been welcomed.

3. The re-armament of Great Britain is regarded as vitally necessary and a strong Canadian defense policy is essential.

4. The need for a Mediterranean understanding with Italy is regarded by most thoughtful people as wise. Italy is just as vulnerable as Great Britain along that line of communication. An understanding with Mussolini is possible since the Rome-Berlin axis shows signs of being subjected to great strain by Nazi ambitions in Eastern Europe.

5. The close co-operation with France. After all Quebec could not look on with equanimity at the complete submergence of France and French culture as the result of aggression.

Now these Chamberlain objectives are welcomed by many leaders in Canada of all creeds and all races. Canada and the other members of the Commonwealth can have little quarrel with them.

Meantime the persecution of Jews and Catholics in Germany has had an effect on United States opinion and the program of rearmament that appears to be in con-

templation by the United States government would tend to resist further aggression by totalitarian powers. There will probably be co-operation between democracies in the attempt to save refugees of various religious groups from oppression and settle them elsewhere. Here is a great humanitarian objective upon which there can be co-operation with the United States.

Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, have just concluded a visit to Paris for the purpose of discussing international relations and the appeasement of Europe with the French government and an announcement has been made that Britain and France have reached complete accord on national defense and joint diplomatic action for peace. Mr. Chamberlain has announced his intention of shortly making a visit to Germany and Italy to further promote his appeasement policy. There can be no doubt that Mr. Chamberlain's plans for appeasement are working and working very much faster than anyone would have thought even two weeks ago.

Where should Canada stand? She is not committed irrevocably to British foreign policy, but there are signs that the Canadian government should and will co-operate with Great Britain and the United States. It is significant that it is becoming more and more the interest of the United States to maintain world-wide lines of trade and commerce and an open door policy throughout the world in which objective the democratic communities of the British Commonwealth can associate themselves. To some extent the United States and Great Britain share a similar apprehension with regard to events in the Far East. In all this it is extremely doubtful whether Canadian policy can move to a position of effective isolation or neutrality. Germany certainly would not recognize our claim of neutrality.

Obviously we must work realistically to keep Canada, United States, Great Britain and France in step. Furthermore, the attitude must be one of willingness "to live and let live" with nations who want other than democratic forms of government.

That there are disadvantages flowing from Munich I will not dispute. It had disagreeable implications. But I am satisfied that the advantages of peace will be much greater than the disadvantages of having Czechoslovakia overrun and a European conflict.

I am sanguine enough to envisage Munich as the beginning of new effort to arrive at greater international sanity. The will to settle controversies by appeasement rather than by force must be re-affirmed. Let us persist in our patient efforts.

Follow the U.S. Lead

By PROF. FRANK H. UNDERHILL
University of Toronto

AS one recalls events in Canada during the critical weeks of last September the feature that stands out most clearly was the eagerness of various worthy and important citizens to pledge other members of the community to participation in a European war. Members of Parliament were committing their constituents, newspaper publishers were committing their readers, Trades and Labor Congress leaders were committing the members of their unions, university presidents were committing their students. But among those who were most vocal I didn't notice any great number who committed themselves to go to the war if it broke out.

War is an activity in which the sacrifices and benefits cannot possibly be shared evenly by all the members of the community. One main conclusion which seems to me to emerge from this last crisis is that the people of Canada should not be committed to an overseas war until they have voted on the question themselves. This is the only way in which the decision whether we shall bury more Canadians in Europe can be shared in by the actual Canadians who will be called upon to make the sacrifice.

We are not yet self-governing in external affairs. If war had come on Oct. 1 last we should have been involved in it willy-nilly, though we have not the slightest control over the policy of the British government which led up to the war situation. We in Canada should now do what has already been done by the South Africans and the Irish, and equip ourselves with the full legal right to neutrality. We should get this recognized by Great Britain and notified to the rest of the world. Then when the next European crisis comes we can make up our minds about our relation to it as independently as our American neighbors will make up their minds about their relation to it. I hasten to assure apoplectic imperialists that of course we might make up our minds to join in the war.

The essential thing accomplished at Munich was to bring to an end the Anglo-French power system which had dominated Europe since 1918 and to substitute for it a German power system. This of course means that the war of 1914-18 has ultimately been won by Germany, since it was to prevent this German hegemony that we went to war in 1914. And this means that whatever sacrifices were made by Canada in that war were largely in vain.

But it is useless to shed tears over this result now. The only way to have prevented it was for the Chamberlain government to work in close co-operation with Soviet Russia, to strengthen the Popular Front in France, to support the government forces in Spain. But this would have meant the triumph of the left throughout Europe, and the Chamberlain people prefer the triumph of fascism, whatever threats that may involve to their investments in the British Empire. They calculate to parry these threats by a working arrangement with Italy and Germany. So the balance of power in Europe has been fundamentally changed and there is nothing we can do about it. If this change has repercussions in America, it is in America that we shall have to deal with the problems arising. And our action here will inevitably be taken under the leadership of the United States.

Here we come upon the real meaning of Munich for Canada. Hitherto we have acted in world politics under the leadership of Great Britain. More and more we shall now find that both for the protection of our material interests and for the pursuit of ideal purposes, such as the defense of democracy, we shall be looking for leadership to the United States. This does not mean that we shall break our

connection with Britain, nor that we shall be annexed by the Yankees. Statesmanship does not consist in making choices of this kind between absolutes. But Canada is a North American nation, and we shall find that, both in providing against attacks upon our territory and in doing what we can to advance the cause of democracy and freedom in the world, the associate with whom we have most in common is the United States.

Munich has meant the collapse of two causes in Europe to which a great many Canadians felt considerable devotion. In the first place it has ended the Collective System which had its centre in Geneva. Long before Munich the so-called National government in Great Britain had demonstrated that it was determined not to follow a League policy. Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain—these are the landmarks in the development of this persistent policy. But right up to the eve of Munich it was possible for optimists to argue that, if war came, Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier would be leading the collective-security forces in spite of themselves, and that we should join in because this was really a collective-security war. The faith that the governing groups who control the British and French governments could really be brought to run some risks for collective security has now suffered its final shattering blow.

As a matter of fact, if the League could not develop into something more than an international war office for the conduct of punitive expeditions against "aggressors," it was already a failure long before Munich. The root cause for the futility of Geneva is that the world has failed to develop any international controls over the economic anarchy which lies behind the political anarchy of our times. But such controls run contrary to the laissez faire traditions of our liberals who profess to be chief League champions.

The second cause which suffered defeat at Munich was the democratic front. Here in America we have always tended to think of Britain and France as holding the front-line trenches in the struggle for democracy while we ourselves were away back in reserve; and this has given us the feeling that we had some obligation to come to the support of Britain and France. But Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier have abandoned the trenches. There is no democratic front line in Europe any more.

Mr. Chamberlain has repeatedly told us that he sees no need for an alignment of democracies against dictatorships, and we should now wake up to realize what his words mean. The class selfishness and class fears of the groups whom Mr. Chamberlain represents make them feel that the real enemy in Europe is not fascism but communism. They will do anything to make terms with the fascist powers because they regard a fascist Europe as a necessary bulwark against "red" movements. And by a red movement they mean any movement which tends to increase the power, political or economic, of the working classes.

We cannot intervene in Europe save under British leadership. As long as the groups behind Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier control the governments of Britain and France we might as well recognize that there will be no leadership from London or Paris in the democratic direction. The democratic front will not be restored in Europe until Daladier and his friends have been ousted by a revived French workers' movement and until Chamberlain and his friends have been ousted by the Labor party in Britain. Neither of these events seems likely to happen in the near future.

So far as we are concerned, then, the democratic front line for the present is here in America. We should concert measures with the United States for our common territorial defense.

Hate Is No Policy

By JOSEPH T. THORSON, K.C.
Member of Parliament, Selkirk Constituency

THERE will, no doubt, be continued controversy over the Munich pact but there will be general agreement on the part of thoughtful people that a more useful purpose would be served if speakers and writers gave more thought to the policies that should be followed in the future and less to recriminations over what has happened in the past, particularly when such recriminations can serve only the purpose of stirring up resentment and hate.

It is impossible to be specific as to the details of future foreign policy for this must of necessity adjust itself to facts and situations as they arise and all that should be attempted is to lay down broad general principles.

The first of these is the maintenance of peace. It is the supreme and sacred responsibility of statesmen and of all those who take part in the moulding of public opinion to safeguard their people from the terrible consequences of a world war that would involve the lives of millions of people and the destruction of our civilization. The maintenance of peace must therefore come first in our foreign policy — unless some principle greater than peace is involved—and we must be certain that some principle greater than peace is really involved before resort is had to war, or to threats of force that are likely to lead to war.

This responsibility for peace is all the greater because the penalties of war will not be paid by those who declare it—but by the masses of the people and by the generations that are to come. It must not be forgotten that the world condition of today is largely the result of the Great War—and we have not yet finished paying the price of that great struggle.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to say what is the best solution of the international problems of Europe and of the rest of the world, or to forecast how long the peace that followed from the Munich agreement will last, but one thing is quite certain. The solution will not be found in war, particularly in the kind of war that would result if the democracies ranged themselves in conflict with the dictatorships. We know from experience the consequences of such an attempt to solve international problems. We must continue our efforts for a solution by pacific means —even if national pride is temporarily hurt in the process—for civilization is worth more than national pride.

One other thing is also certain. A foreign policy built upon hatred cannot succeed, whether it be hatred of other nations or hatred of other systems of government. True believers in democracy are firmly convinced that a dictatorship system of government cannot permanently survive in any country and that it must end inevitably in revolution from within that country. If this is so let us not throw the world into war to end a system of government in some other country when that end is inevitable. Why not let time and the intelligence of the people in that country work out the result? Furthermore what right have we to hate and condemn a whole nation because we do not approve of its leaders or the form of government under which it lives?

It is much more important for us in Canada to fight against evils in our own country and make our own democracy worth while for our people than to worry about forms of government in other countries.

The case against Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier rests upon the assumption that war is inevitable between the democracies of France and Great Britain on the one hand and Fascist Germany on the other; that they cannot continue to exist side by side with one another and that one must destroy the other—and the sooner the better. It is asserted that since

Munich, Germany has obtained domination in Central Europe to the detriment of Great Britain and France.

Surely this assumption is false and this assertion is subject to further consideration. Germany has always had a greater sphere of influence in Central Europe than Great Britain. What right have Great Britain and France to complain of that? They have their spheres of influence elsewhere. Surely history has already taught us the impossibility of keeping a great nation in a permanent state of repression. It cannot be done. The Allies tried it in the case of Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty was supposed to make the world safe for democracy—but it made democracy impossible in Germany. Instead, it prepared the ground for Herr Hitler and his Nazi government.

Why not try a different policy, built upon the maxim of "live and let live"? The people of Germany have a right to live—and to trade with other countries. Indeed their prosperity is essential to our own. Surely the present attempt to establish pacific relations with Germany and Italy is worth making. It offers a chance of peace—and while there is a chance of peace it should be taken; the alternative leads inevitably to war.

What should our foreign policy in Canada be? Firstly, our leaders owe their duty first to the Canadian people—and should maintain the right of Canada to decide whether she will participate in war or not. The Canadian people should put themselves in the position where they can decide this issue, if it should arise, coolly—without hysteria built upon false propaganda. The maintenance of this Canadian right will act as a useful brake upon British foreign policy—and it may be an important one if British statesmen should show an inclination towards warlike action without due regard to the consequences. If a greater principle than peace is involved—such as the very existence of Great Britain and France—the whole world will be vitally interested. But if the contest is one only of prestige or of political or military or economic dominance, or of British interests not touching the existence of Great Britain, Canada should not participate. By adopting such a foreign policy for Canada, her leaders would serve not only the best interests of the Canadian people—which is their first concern—but the peace of the world as well.

Put Our House In Order

By MURDOCK A. MacPHERSON, K.C.

Former Attorney-General and Provincial Treasurer of Saskatchewan

THE world crisis of September was different from such crises in the past in its effect on the Canadian people. There was not the disposition to follow brass bands; to congregate; to get worked up into a state of patriotic ardor, but there was a deadly earnestness beneath it all and generally a singular unanimity of opinion that Canadians were prepared to make sacrifices of treasure and blood if necessary, should the call come.

Admittedly there was disappointment that the British government apparently yielded to the demands of Hitler, but this disappointment was tempered by the knowledge that Chamberlain was a great democrat and that he knew the situation of preparedness better than anyone else and averted war convinced that the democratic world was not prepared for war.

It has been provoking and annoying, I think, to the majority of citizens, to know that those who clamored most for a firm hand and stern measures were those who during the last ten years have most ardently supported peace, who most openly condemned cadet training in the schools, defense expenditure and preparedness generally.

In discussing the issue as to "where we go from here," it is submitted that no man should condemn Chamberlain unless he was prepared at once to have shouldered a rifle to fight for Czechoslovakia or be prepared that his son fight and die, if necessary. No woman can adopt that attitude fairly unless she were prepared to have her husband or son fight and die if necessary.

Whether we like it or not, the Munich settlement was arrived at; war was averted; and now the future must be considered. Hitler's latest anti-Semitic drive, the very horror of it, accentuates the necessity for clear and reasonable thinking. In Canada if we value for ourselves and wish to pass on to our children those liberties, civil and religious, which are ours, then we must strengthen our defenses, prepare our people and be ready for that day when, if the issue is joined as between the democratic idea and the dictatorship idea, we can make a contribution and maintain the traditions set for Canada in the Great War of 1914-18. We must forget "Peace at any price" as a slogan; we must frown as we should frown as citizens, on organizations created for the purpose of propagating a doctrine which is inimical to the maintenance of civil and religious liberties, in that in the last analysis it will but take the iron out of the blood of our people and expose them to physical and moral decay. We must furthermore be a real factor in the British Commonwealth.

In asking where we go from here we had better just take a look at our own domestic situation. There is uncertainty, disaffection and distrust as between the various parts of our own country. This must be eliminated and that without delay. Each part of this nation is complementary and supplementary to the other, but there must be established a spirit of unity which at the moment does not exist. Largely this is due to the fact that unemployment persists as the chief local problem of every community in Canada. We must not forget that people in other countries have turned from a democratic form of government to dictatorship, feeling that under a dictatorship there would be some form of social security at least by way of food, clothing and shelter.

It is not good enough in this democracy to dismiss the matter by saying that by relief allowances we are taking care of destitution. We cannot longer dismiss summarily the idea of work and wages, but must realize that nationally, through conjoint action of private enterprise and governments, work must be provided.

Furthermore, there is the danger of children of unemployed coming along to young manhood and womanhood with the

same aversion to work simply because in the scheme of things we have allowed matters to drift and have not heeded in a real way the necessity of gainful employmnet for youth. In many countries they were prepared to abandon, and did abandon their liberties, civil and religious, in order to obtain what they deemed was a measure of social security.

We must provide social security in a democracy. We can only do that by strengthening the central authority at Ottawa, extending its powers, restoring condence to the rank and file of our people and embarking on reasonable social legislation such as obtains in Britain and thus indicating a measure of hope not only to the laborer, but to the primary producer of this country.

Before, therefore, we proceed to consider our place in the Commonwealth, we should first deal with our own domestic situation and deal with it in a way that will prevent the nation from crumbling or from becoming balkanized. We do not need to destroy the economic system which we live under, but we do need to permit it to function.

A real program of physical development for our youth should be undertaken by the National department of health in conjunction with all provincial departments of health. In our homes and educational institutions we must discriminate between liberty and license, we must stress the obligations of the citizen as well as his rights.

Then in a Commonwealth there must be a closer getting together of the nations in the partnership. If it is a partnership it must be a partnership in fact as well as in name. The business of this partnership of nations is to maintain for its citizens those democratic rights which we cherish so much and which find expression in freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of association and religious freedom.

If the mutual sympathy and co-operation does not exist, if misunderstandings develop, then this partnership of nations must dissolve just as surely as any mercantile partnership or professional partnership with similar misunderstandings must dissolve.

The dissolution of the British Commonwealth would be a tragedy for Canada. It behooves us, therefore, soberly and sanely to realize what the situation is; attend to our domestic problems at the earliest possible moment; abandon mere partisan feeling in order to obtain what is best in the national good, and then, our domestic difficulties straightened out, pull our full weight in the Commonwealth boat. In the interim Canada must, notwithstanding her apparent disunity at the moment, work in the closest co-operation with Britain.

A French-Canadian Speaks

By NOEL BERNIER

Barrister-At-Law, Winnipeg and St. Boniface

A GREAT deal of what led to Munich, and a great deal of what really took place at Munich, will probably remain unknown to us, for a long time at least. But in common with the rest of the world, we know that during a few tense hours, war was looked upon as something inevitable.

We, as a portion of the Empire, must be grateful to Great Britain for her conduct during those crucial moments; she saved peace for the world at large, and she played safe for herself and the British Commonwealth. Preventing a general conflagration even at great sacrifice was in itself a supreme achievement, and if it is true that the British and French armies were not fully prepared, then Munich becomes even more clearly comprehensible.

In long-range estimations, and notably in international affairs, we can trust England. She is not, of course, immune from mistakes, but history tells us that she has foresight and resoluteness for long-term liquidations, and also a high moral sense of her responsibilities as a major power. Mr. Chamberlain's heroic trips to Germany may have broken some diplomatic precedents, but, above the usual formulas of approach, they, in essence, well illustrated the patient courage which made modern England the strong and beneficent country that she is.

It is not a wild guess to believe that several London statesmen who have accused the prime minister of weakness would have done exactly as he did, if they had been clothed with his heavy responsibility. Their words in the House of Commons—memorable patriotic words indeed—seem when closely analyzed to express a regret much more than a protest. The Chamberlains are not a weak race; until we learn more about Munich, we may estimate that the prime minister of England acted with consummate wisdom. So much for the past.

And now, what about the future? *Where do we go from here?* Munich is a fact—a hard fact which unquestionably meant a shifting of influence. The fortunes of the nations involved in the contention have not, however, been permanently settled by the Munich agreement of 1938 any more than they were settled by the Versailles treaty of 1919. There is nothing permanent in this world. Twenty years, and less, have done a lot in the very recent past, and the same length of time may also do a lot in the immediate future. It depends largely on the virtues of discipline, cohesion and all-round fairness which the democracies can muster.

All those who love England can hope for the best; she is still intact in her vitals, she has the sinews of war, she has her genius for organization and negotiation, and her people are particularly fitted for long fights of every order. Beside England stands France, admirable France, also intact in both spiritual and physical strength. On the other side of the fence, we have the totalitarian countries, which are also loaded with cares and will eventually discover that in the exact measure in which they trespass on the rights of others, they accumulate trouble for themselves. History, ancient and modern, is full of that truth.

What will be the effect on Canada of the European upheaval? Whatever might have been our individual views on imperial or international policies up to this date, we have to take stock anew. A careful survey of the entire field forces us to reach conclusions which we have, so far, conveniently adjourned.

A point which should, now or never, be stressed with frankness is that the nations living outside of Europe should not be expected to necessarily tie their fate to the fate of Europe. To come to specific geography, the young countries of North America do not have to carry on with

the secular quarrels and inveterate bellicose instincts of the old countries. The European equilibrium is not our problem. On this side of the water, we have no "irredentist" doctrine to put forward. Instead of frontier fortifications, we have the Rush-Bagot treaty, and it certainly is not a scrap of paper. Is there any selfishness or cowardice in accepting the implications of our geographical location? To use the very recent wording of a Winnipeg newspaper "a powerful and friendly nation has openly declared her intention of helping to protect Canadian shores from invasion."

We have often been lectured on the moral obligation which rests on every self-respecting country to do its share in enforcing right throughout the world. But, exactly, what is right? Where is it? And where does it reside in permanence? Specifically, what is the right of conquest, so familiar to Europe? With what scales are we to weigh all the imponderables and unpredictables of that beyond-the-sea philosophy? Where is the Canadian of genius who will lead us through this labyrinth? In her own practical way Great Britain is withdrawing gradually from most of her continental commitments. Is this not a justification for Canada to be cautious, with her lean treasure and small population?

Our path seems clear enough, at least for some time; in so far as international affairs are concerned, we should mind our own business and not roam about as would-be conquerors; and in so far as defensive military preparations are concerned we should lose no time in fortifying our eastern and western shores—this in conjunction with both Great Britain and our friends to the south.

Once we are impregnable at home, we shall be in a better position to face events, be what they may.

This is as far as we can go, under the troubling circumstances created by Munich.

Before closing these lines, we throw in this special thought, for local consumption: In order to be strong against any possible exterior menace, we should, as between Canadians, remove all causes of friction and all obstacles to perfect unity. Race and creed dissensions should come tc an end in Canada.

An American View

By WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE

William Allen White, of the Emporia Gazette (Kansas), is the acknowledged dean of American editors. He has never set up to be an authority on international affairs, but is the interpreter and reflector par excellence of small-town Middle Western opinion. Mr. White has long been a friend of Britain, and his piece on the British Lion, "Beware of the Hell Cat," was greatly enjoyed by Tribune readers at the height of the recent crisis.

For Canadian readers, the significance of Mr. White's contribution to this series—reprinted by special permission from the Emporia Gazette—is not so much his gloomy view of the decline of British prestige as a result of the Peace of Munich, which he himself says may be only temporary. It lies, equally, in the admission that for one hundred years the United States has lain sheltered behind the British navy and now finds herself out in a cold, cold world. If, as he says, the United States must shift for herself in defenses, now more than ever necessary for North America, does this not put the matter of defense even more keenly up to Canada?

FOR more than a hundred years, Americans, despite their national pride and Yankee brag, have grown up under the protection of the British fleet. All the world has known that blood was thicker than water. Millions of emigrants have come to this land from other countries—Germans, Italians, Poles, Austrians. Nevertheless, this has been one of the English-speaking and English-thinking democracies. It was inevitable that we should fight beside the British in the World War. No amount of German propaganda before we entered the war could have kept us out. For our pattern of life is the British pattern, our ideals of justice are English.

Thus, inevitably, if we had been attacked by any other country at any time since 1812, Great Britain would have come to our rescue. Even the ruffled feathers of the Civil War and the blather of tail-twisting Irish politicians did not disturb the British lion's interest in America as his natural ally and blood-bound friend. We have grown to our present dimensions, the dominant force in the Western Hemisphere, under the shadow of the British fleet.

And now we walk alone. For the first time since the Declaration of Independence, America, these beloved United States, must realize that the British Empire is disintegrating, that the British fleet no longer offers protection even to Great Britain and alas—that the imperial English-speaking union of dominions is a second-class power. What strength the United States has as a nation must be our own strength. The apron-strings are cut. We have, of course, all the instinctive affection for Great Britain that we have had through these decades and long generations. But little good it will do us! Great Britain is fighting with her back to the wall. She had her problem of self-preservation. She is scorned in the world because she has revealed her physical weakness. No longer can the British lion's roar send teror to an enemy's heart. No longer can we feel the warm thrill of pride, based upon our own safety, in the achievements of Great Britain. She must drink her cup alone. We must stand on our own two feet and fight our way in a hostile world wherein a great international force, the philosophy of tyrants, despises our democracy and all its ways.

When the British allowed the Japanese to take Canton and isolate Hong Kong, the great British trading post in the East, when Britain saw today the fall of Hankow, a flare went up to enlighten the world that Britannia no longer rules the waves. She does not dare to face the Japanese in the East, the Germans on the

continent, and Mussolini at Gibraltar and Suez. As a world leader today England is crippled. She may arouse herself, she may pull herself together, she may fight her way back. But on this day and date, the British fleet moves in the fog of its former glory, a tradition, a shimmering memory!

This, the percussion engine has done, an invention of land-loving man who has stuck devil's wings from that light engine. These winged hellions have wiped out the British channel. They have made London a vassal capital as surely as the Roman legions did this two thousand years ago. And with the vassal city of the Islands, all those lands and powers which lie under the shadow of that city, the English-speaking democracies, are threatened with bondage. They, too, must fight—but on their own.

We have come into a new era. Young people whose sires and grandsires, back through a hundred years, have rested secure and have waxed rich and prosperous behind the wall of British ships, now stand stark and naked to their enemies and must fight their own way to power or fall into bondage and decay.

Mainly A Summary

THE first noteworthy thing about *The Tribune's* series under this heading, now being concluded, is the interest shown in it by the most diverse readers. The second, closely related to the first, is the welcome that has been given by writers as well as readers to the idea of a realistic examination of Canadian and Commonwealth foreign policy in the light of the new situation registered at Munich, with the emphasis placed upon the future.

As was remarked at the outset, the main idea of the series was to get away from mere post-mortems and to invite positive contributions from a wide variety of Canadians. Hence the title, "Where Do We Go From Here?"

It was not to be expected that those who took part in the symposium would wholly refrain from looking back over their shoulders at recent events. Nor was it desirable that they should do so since the future is, to a large extent, implicit in the past. But there has been an evident need in Canada for looking forward.

New lines of division in opinion appeared with the Peace of Munich. Among those supporting the agreement are to be found certain Canadian nationalists, Quebec nationalists, some isolationists and supporters of the no-commitments-to-anybody theory. These approve because they feel that the settlement avoided immediate war in which Canada would, in fact, have participated almost automatically. Thus, many of those usually lukewarm toward British policies tend, now, to be largely pro-Chamberlain.

On the other hand, a number of traditional supporters of British policy have been disappointed at the democratic retreat, and some have been positively shocked. But throughout much of the discussion there still runs the theme of relief that world war was avoided, at least for the time being, and of realization that the alternative to Munich was almost certainly immediate war. And among our contributors were several who gave the warmest welcome to the policy of attempting to make friends with Germany—who regarded it as offering the hope of a new start toward peace.

One pretense has been forever shown up by the recent crisis. Few will now maintain that Canada would not have been involved at once, had war broken out over the Czech-Sudeten issue last September. Parliament would have been called upon to "decide" only the extent of Canadian participation—how many aeroplanes, how many men she should send, and questions of that sort.

As a consequence of this, particularly among the isolationists, there is likely to be a growing demand for clarifying Canada's position and for legislation on the South African model designed to permit Canada to remain neutral if she chooses, in wars in which other members of the Commonwealth may be engaged. It is argued that this demand for the right to neutrality does not mean that Canada would exercise that right if a similar crisis should arise in the future.

On the other hand, in the opinion of many, the recent crisis demonstrated something much more than the automatic commitment to Canada. It showed, in their view, that Canadians by and large were prepared to go to war, upon the issues of September, 1938, voluntarily and without the slightest trace of flag-waving. If that was so in the last crisis, there is the strong presumption that it will be so again in the next one, if it should prove

to be parallel to the September crisis—unless the events of Munich, and after have sharply changed opinion.

That there has been some drift of opinion in Canada as a result of Munich seems fairly obvious. Munich, at long last, brought the realization that the League of Nations is dead, even to the large number of last-ditch adherents of Geneva. Of these, some appear to be veering toward North American isolationism, others toward a Commonwealth policy of co-operation with the democracies — especially the United States—in sheer self-defense.

On the other hand, also among those who would strengthen Commonwealth bonds, there is the realization that decisions of peace and war were made for the Empire in September at London, and London only. That Canada had no real part in the decisions was due not least to the Canadian government's studied policy of hands-off for fear of being committed. From the imperialist side, also, there is some call for re-examination of Commonwealth relations, for a strengthening of the machinery of consultation and for a much more active attitude on the part of the Canadian government in Commonwealth and foreign policy, if only to make the "partnership" real.

An immediate issue stands out. There has been remarkable agreement among *The Tribune's* contributors upon the need of defense. Imperialists recognize the need of British and Empire defenses greater than ever before. Isolationists are thinking in terms of Canadian or North American defense. There should be no difficulty in getting Canadians to agree at least upon the need for far greater national defense in this Dominion.

Finally, implicit in most of the discussion was the need of new effort for Canadian unity. In the shaping of foreign policy, considerations of interest, geography, history and sentiment all will play their part. But if this country is to play any effective role in the affairs of the world it must put its own house in order and achieve greater national unity upon major domestic, no less than international, policies.

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